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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence.
72
Without the exclusionary rule, there may be no effective way to protect
fourth amendment rights; 73 if so, abandoning the exclusionary rule may
mean disregarding the fourth amendment, an important part of the nation's
charter of existence.
Logically the basic defect in Stone v. Powell is the Court's refusal to
overrule Mapfs holding that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally
required. 74 As long as the exclusionary rule is deemed to be based on the
Constitution, there is no logical reason to distinguish it from other rights
reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings. 75 However, the Court may be
reluctant to dispose of the Mapp holding because of fear that without it there
will be no remedy for fourth amendment violations. In the words of Mapp,
failure to enforce the exclusionary rule ". . . is to grant the [fourth





In re Marriage of Powers'
Patricia Powers filed suit for dissolution against her husband, Robert,
after ten years of marriage. The trial court awarded primary custody of the
couple's child to Mrs. Powers. The husband was given "temporary custody '2
72. "367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
73. The failure of tort remedies to deter illegal searches led to adoption of the
exclusionary rule. Id. at 651-53. Some scholars have pointed to the Canadian tort
remedy for illegal searches as an alternative to the exclusionary rule, but it is not clear
the Canadian remedy serves as a practical deterrent in Canada. Canon, supra note 71,
at 692 n.53. Chief Justice Burger's proposal in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971), for an administrative tribunal to award
compensation for violations of fourth amendment rights would seem to be more
workable, but it is difficult to imagine even such a professional tribunal routinely
awarding appropriate damages to "morally unworthy" prisoners who were convicted
through the introduction of illegally seized evidence.
74. 367 U.S. at 649.
75. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
76. 367 U.S. at 656.
1. 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
2. Id. at 952. Technically, the award would not qualify as temporary custody
under § 452.380, RSMO 1975 Supp. This section contemplates a temporary custody
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RECENT CASES
of his son two and one-half weekends a month, one day during each week,
three weeks during the summer, and on some holidays.
Mrs. Powers appealed the decree alleging that the trial court abused its
discretion by granting the husband excessive visitation privileges. The basis
of her position was that her son's best interests would not be served by
frequently being shifted back and forth between his parents. She also
asserted that the award deprived her of her son's company.3 The Missouri
Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in making the award and affirmed its decision.4 More specifically,
the appellate court found that the "temporary custody" allowed by the
decree was in the child's best interest. Refusing to characterize the award as
one providing for "unprecedented and unreasonably excessive" shifts in
custody, the court concluded that the custody arrangement only provided
the father with "reasonable visitation rights."5
By statutory directive the courts are to consider custody arrangements
in dissolution based on the best interest of the child. 6 In 1973, the legislature
enacted guidelines for courts to use in determining the best interests of the
child.7 However, these guidelines are not exclusive and remain vague
because of the varying situations arising in child custody cases.8 Conse-
quently, court decisions are relevant in understanding the rationale used to
determine the types of custody arrangements which are beneficial to the
child.
order being granted prior to a final decree. However, the court never discusses the
inappropriateness of the label. Rather, the court discusses the decree as if Mr. Powers
had been granted visitation rights. Thus, for clarity, the term visitation will be used
throughout this paper instead of temporary custody.
3. Id. at 952-53.
4. Id. at 952.
5. Id. at 953.
6. § 452.120, RSMo 1969 provides:
In all proceedings for divorce or other proceedings in which shall be
involved the right to custody and control of minor children,. .. the rights
of the parents shall be equal, and neither parent as such shall have any right
paramount to that of the other parent, but in each case the court shall
decide only as the best interests of the child itself may seem to require.
This section was repealed by Laws 1973, p. 4 7 0 A, effective January 1, 1974. The new
section is now section 452.375, RSMo 1976 Supp., which provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best inter-
ests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents as to his custody;
(2) The wishes of a child as to his custodian;
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interests;
(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
7. See statute quoted note 6 supra.
8. V.M. v. L.M., 526 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975). The court
states as follows: "There is no exact formula for the determination under this worthy
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The three districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals traditionally have
rejected divided custody arrangements. The courts shun "experiments"
which provide for the child's custody being frequently shifted back and forth
from one parent to the other.9 Although the children should have the
benefit of both parents, divided custody is not approved. 10 However, this has
not been translated into discouragement of liberal and frequent visitation
privileges for the non-custodial parent. The question which arises is how to
differentiate between visitation, which provides for beneficial association
with both parents, and divided custody.
The distinction remains less than clear because of the appellate court's
refusal to adopt a rigid philosophy which consistently dictates custody
awards. Presently, there are two contrasting views with regard to the
feasibility and desirability of divided custody. Those authors who believe
that the courts should be more inclined toward dividing custody argue that
frequent association with both parents promotes and maintains parental
interest in the child, and therefore, serves the best interest of the child."
This view has been adopted by the North Carolina legislature. 12
In contrast, some authors are opposed to any formalized custodial
arrangements in both parents. For example, the authors of Beyond the Best
Interest of the Child13 contend that the "non-custodial parent should not have
legally enforceable rights to visit the child." They argue that visitation
privileges in the non-custodial parent are detrimental to the child because
these visits impair the security of the ongoing relationship between the child
and the custodial parent. 14 Texas, while recognizing the non-custodial
parent's visitation rights, is firmly committed to providing the child with a
secure environment with one parent.'5 Consequently, the appellate courts
frequently reverse custody decrees which provide the non-custodial parent
with extensive visitation privileges.' 6
The Missouri position is between these two extremes. The statutory
scheme enacted in 1973 envisions one custodian with liberal visitation
privileges given to the non-custodial parent.17 The custodial parent is vested
9. E.g., Irvine v. Aust, 193 S.W.2d 336, 342 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946) cited in
Schumm v. Schumm, 223 S.W.2d 122, 126 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 526 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975). See
also J. Speca & R. Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of Children in Divorce Cases in
Missouri, 38 UMKC L. REV. 1, 6-15 (1969).
11. Note, Divided Custody of Children After Their Parents'Divorce, 8 J. FAMILY L.
58 (1968). But, this author criticizes courts which refuse to modify a divided custody
award when presented with evidence that it is disadvantageous to the child. Flanagan
v. Flanagan, 195 Or. 611, 247 P.2d 212 (1952).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (Supp. Vol. 2a 1975).
13. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OFTHE
CHILD (1973).
14. Id. at 38.
15. Martin v. Martin, 132 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
16. See, e.g., Heard v. Bell, 434 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
17. Compare the wording of § 452.375, RSMo 1976 Supp. (custody determina-
tions) with § 452.400, RSMo 1975 Supp. (visitation rights). See also § 452.405, RSMO
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with the right to determine questions concerning the child's upbringing.1 8
The child's need for security is also protected by stringent requirements
concerning modification of a custody decree.19 But, visitation privileges of
the non-custodial parent are protected by the statute, unless he or she is
unfit.20 After the Powers decision, it is evident that the Missouri courts will
refuse to adopt the label of divided custody, but the judiciary will continue to
be inclined toward promoting the non-custodial parent's interest in the child
by awarding liberal visitation privileges when the appropriate factual situa-
tion exists.2 1
The appellate court's apparent inconsistency in labeling specific decrees
as providing for reasonable visitation or divided custody may be explained
by three factors. First, the appellate court is reluctant to modify or reverse a
custody award. The trial judge is in a unique position to observe the
1975 Supp. where the custodian is generally allowed to determine the child's
upbringing. Infra at notes 43, 45.
18. § 452.405(1), RSMo 1975 Supp. provides:
Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the time of the
custody decree, the custodian may determine the child's upbringing,
including his education, health care, and religious training, unless the
court after hearing, finds, upon motion by the non-custodial parent, that in
the absence of a specific limitation of the custodian's authority, the child's
physical health would be endangered or his emotional development
impaired.
19. § 452.410, RSMo 1975 Supp. provides:
The court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon
the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were
unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the
modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
While flexible in the determination of the original decree, the Missouri courts have
traditionally been reluctant to modify a decree. By court decision, an award would
not be modified unless the person seeking a change in the original decree could show
a change in circumstances and that the child's best interests would be served by
modification. See, e.g., I- v. I-, 482 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972). The
Missouri courts have not yet decided if the new statutory requirements limit the
circumstances which may justify a modification. MeinKing v. MeinKing, 529 S.W.2d
440,444 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975). But see McFadden v. McFadden, 509 S.W.2d 795,
798 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974). See alsoL. Hudak, Seize, Run, andSue: TheIgnominyof
Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REV. 521 (1974).
20. § 452.400, RSMo 1975 Supp. provides:
(1) A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable
visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would
endanger the child's physical health or impair his emotional development.
(2) The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation
rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child but
the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the
visitation would endanger the child's physical health or impair his emo-
tional development.
21. 527 S.W.2d at 953. The Powers court refers to the Tuesday night custody
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demeanor, character, and sincerity of the witness.22 Therefore, the trial
court's findings as to the credibility of the witnesses will not be questioned on
appeal. 23 Notwithstanding appellate review of the evidence, 24 the appellate
court will not disturb the trial court's custody award unless it is "clearly
erroneous,"2 and the welfare of the child requires a different result.2 6
The second factor which influences the appellate court in determining
the suitability of the custody arrangement is the interaction of the parties
involved. 27 When there is evidence that the parties are unable to amiably
adapt, frequent visitation privileges of substantial duration will not be
allowed. The case of Wood v. Wood 28 is illustrative. The trial court in Wood
22. E.g., FeItman v. Feltman, 514 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974); E-
(S-) v. E-, 507 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Ramos v. Ramos, 232 S.W.2d
188 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
23. In re Zigler, 529 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); R. L. S. v. J. E. S.,
522 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975) cited by In re Powers, 527 S.W.2d at 952;
McFadden v. McFadden, 509 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974). Mo. Sup. CT. R.
73.01 dictates this result. The rule outlines procedures to be used in a trial by court.
The rule states that on appellate review "due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to have judged the credibility of the witnesses." Mo. SUP. CT. R.
73.01(3)(b).
24. Compare, Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30,32 (Mo. En Banc 1976) with In
re Zigler, 529 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); In re Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949,
954 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); J-G-W- v. J-L-S--, 414 S.W.2d 352 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1967); Rone v. Rone, 20 S.W.2d 545 (Spr. Mo. App. 1929).
25. In re Powers, 527 S.W.2d at 952. Accord, Feltman v. Feltman, 514 S.W.2d
353 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974); H-B- v. R-B--, 449 S.W.2d 890 (St. L, Mo. App.
1970). See also R.L.S. v. J. E. S., 522 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975) where the
court states that the trial court's decision will be affirmed unless the evidence is
"palpably insufficient to sustain the findings." This changing standard was the result
of a 1974 modification of Mo. SUP. CT. R. 73.01 as adopted March 29, 1974 (to be
effective January 1, 1975). The new rule deletes the words "the judgment shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous." Mo. SuP. CT. R. 73.01 (d). Interpreting the 1974
revision and clarifying its effect, the Missouri Supreme Court En Banc said that "the
use of the words de novo and clearly erroneous was no longer appropriate ... .
Instead, the supreme court said that the trial court's judgment or decree will be
sustained by the appellate court "unless there is no substantial evidence to support it,
unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law,
or unless it erroneously applies the law." But, in applying this standard, the supreme
court directed the appellate courts to "exercise the power. . .with caution," Murphy
v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
26. The appellate courts presume that the child is with the right parent based
upon the trial court's decree. E- (S-) v. E-, 507 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974); Yount v. Yount, 366 S.W.2d 744 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
27. In re Powers, 527 S.W.2d at 953. This emphasis suggests that there are few
inclinations of appellate judges that are transformed into maxims. For example, the
Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, cited M-L- v. M-R-, 407 S.W.2d 600
(Spr. Mo. App. 1966) for the pi'oposition that "the only rigid, inflexible and unyield-
ing principle in child custody cases is that the welfare of the child is paramount and
supreme. . . ... I- v. I-, 482 S.W.2d 523,528 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972) (emphasis
added). The Missouri cases are contrasted in Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963).
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awarded each parent full custody in alternating years. The arrangement
proved to be disharmonious and resulted in repeated litigation. Both
spouses sought modification of the decree expressing a belief that the
instability of the custody arrangement was disadvantageous to the child. In
reviewing the modification award of the trial court, the court of appeals
stated that "except for good reason, the child should not be shifted periodi-
cally from one home to another."29 The Powers court distinguished Wood on
the rationale that Mr. Powers had only been awarded reasonable visitation
rights and not alternating periods of full custody.3 °
The disdain for frequent shifts in custody has been expressed when the
alternating periods of custody involved less time than a year. In these cases
there were also indications that the child was or would be upset by the
arrangement. In Draper v. Draper3 l the court refused to sanction alternating
custody every six months for two pre-school aged children. According to the
wife's motion to modify, the oldest child, age three and a half, became
"nervous and ill when transferred from one home to another." Similarly, the
court in J-G--W- v. J-L-S- 3  disallowed the children's weekend visits
with their mother on the rationale that they were too frequent. An influen-
tial factor was that the children were disturbed with the visits and the court
found that they were being subjected to the "bickering and backbiting" of
the parents. A mandatory summer visit with a father in Missouri was
reversed in Emerson v. Emerson33 when the court granted the mother permis-
sion to move the child to the Philippines. The court concluded that the
parents were incapable of sharing "amicable divided custody."
The appellate court has upheld awards providing for visitation periods
of reasonable frequency or duration when the facts did not indicate discord
between the parties. In Westerman v. Westerman34 a trial court's award of
alternating custody of a three and one-half year old child every six months
was affirmed. The court was of the opinion that the father was a man of good
character and his proposed living arrangements for his daughter would
stimulate her development. The court of appeals in Baker v. Baker
35
instructed the trial court to award the father visitation privileges every other
29. Id. at 437.
30. In re Powers, 527 S.W.2d at 953.
31. 364 S.W.2d 27 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962). The court states as follows: "Chil-
dren, generally, and except for good reasons, should not be shifted every few months
from one home to another." Supra at 30.
32. J-G-W- v. J-L---S--, 414 S.W.2d 352, 359 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
33. Emerson v. Emerson, 419 S.W.2d 291 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
34. 153 S.W.2d 825 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941). Accord, Childres v. O'Neal, 476
S.W.2d 799 (Ark. 1972).
35. 475 S.W.2d 130 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971). However, the trial court was
reversed for splitting the children between the parents. The court stated that
brothers and sisters should remain together unless it is necessary to disturb the
"normal pattern of family relationship." But, the court instructed the trial court to
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weekend and four weeks in the summer. The court has also approved
awards where the child remained with one parent during the school year
and the other during the summer.36 The last award was explained in the
following terms:
With such a liberal division of custody, each of the parents will have
an opportunity to impart the best of their experience. . . and at
the same time continue to build the mutual love and respect which
must exist between parent and child for the child's future growth
and well-being. .... 37
Thus, the court recognized that where the parties can favorably interact
both parents have responsibilities in the rearing of the child.
The court's desire to promote association with both parents is the third
factor explaining the liberal visitation privileges enjoyed by Missouri
parents. Fathers are considered fit to be the custodians of their children.38
Consequently, the concept that the mother is presumed to be the most
appropriate custodian to advance the best interest of the child of tender
years has not been conclusively applied in Missouri. 39 In fact, the father's
36. Girvin v. Girvin, 471 S.W.2d 683 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
37. Id. at 686.
38. This position is statutorily dictated and has been so construed by the courts.
E.g., Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932); Abel v. Ingram, 223 Mo.
App. 1087, 24 S.W.2d 1048 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930). Thus, the derogatory opinions
expressed by the delegates to the ABA Convention are not officially recognized in
Missouri. 1 BNA FAM. L. REP. at 2708-09 (Transfer Binder 1974-75). See also
Miller, Life With Father: A New Look at Divorce, Custody, The Kansas City Times, April
13, 1976, at 6B. But see Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262 (1976).
39. Johnson v. Johnson, 526 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); M-L- v.
M-R-, 407 S.W.2d 600 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966). However, in some cases there are
flowering tributes to motherhood. For example, in Keith v. Keith, 95 S.W.2d 669,672(K.C. Mo. App. 1936), the court said that a child needs "above all else, the tender love
and affection of a mother." The cases are collected in Horst v. McLain, 466 S.W.2d
187 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971). The present approach is to apply the presumption when
"all things are equal." Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203 (Spr. Mo. App. 1938). The
districts are split on the appropriate standards to apply in determining if all things
are equal. One line of cases requires the father to show that the mother was
demonstrably unfit before he is given custody. E.g., Horst v. McLain, 466 S.W.2d
187 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971); Paxton v. Paxton, 319 S.W.2d 280 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958).
However, other cases have said that it was not an abuse of discretion to award the
children to the father when neither parent was "shown to be an improper custodian."
E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 526 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975) citing Brand v.
Brand, 441 S.W.2d 750 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969). Accord, Davis v. Davis, 354 S.W.2d 526
(Spr. Mo. App. 1962). The father has also been given custody when he was able to
show that the mother was engaged in activity or possessed a characteristic which
might be detrimental to the best interests of the child. Bolten v. Bolten, 507 S.W.2d
46 (Mo. App., D. K.C. 1974) (immature); McC. v. McC., 501 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. App.,
D. K.C. 1973) (pleasure seeking); Endicott v. Endicott, 435 S.W.2d 388 (K.C. Mo,
App. 1968) (abusive to the child); Wood v. Wood, 400 S.W.2d 431 (St. L. Mo. App.
1966) (working full time); Schneider v. Schneider, 248 S.W.2d 59 (St. L. Mo. App.
1952) (pleasure seeking). When the mother's actions may be characterized as
immoral, the courts are split. Compare, C.S. v. R.J.S., 488 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 197) with T- v. T-, 483 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. App., D. K.C. 1972) where the
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